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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

PEGGY ALLRED, aka PEGGY
LOVEJOY, aka THELMA
ALLRED,
Defendant and Appellant.

10752

PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT
SALT LAKE CITY'S PETITION FOR
REHEARING

The respondent Salt Lake City Corporation respectfully petitions this court for rehearing in the above
entitled action and alleges that the court in its majority
opinion filed on July 17, 1967, erred on the following
points:
The State of Utah has not pre-empted the field
of sexual offenses to the exclusion of city ordinances
upon the same subject.
I.

1

2. The statutes of the State of Utah do not make

prostitution or the commission of an act of sexual intercourse for hire a state offense.
3. Salt Lake City does have authority to enact the

ordinance in question.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff-respondent Salt Lake
City Corporation prays that this action be reheard by
this Honorable Court, and that the foregoing errors of
the court be corrected in the interest of law, public
order and justice.
Respectfully submitted,
HOMER HOLMGREN
Salt Lake City Attorney
JACK L. CRELLIN
Assistant Salt Lake City Attorney
DON L. BYBEE
Assistant Salt Lake City Prosecutor
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
Salt Lake City Corporation
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SALT L~KE CITY, a municipal
corporation,
Plaintiff and Resvondent,
vs.

I
1

Case No.

PEGGY ALLRED, aka PEGGY
LOVEJOY, aka THELMA
ALLRED,
Defendant and Appellant.

10752

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR REHEARING

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant was convicted in the city and district court of aiding and abetting in the commission of
a crime by directing a police officer to a certain apartment to obtain sexual intercourse for hire in violation
of Section 32-2-1 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt
Lake City, Utah, 1965.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATE OF UTAH HAS NOT PREEMPTED THE FIELD OF SEXUAL OFFENSES TO THE EXCLUSION OF CITY
ORDINANCES UPON THE SAME SUBJECT.
The majority opinion of the court in its decision
holds as follows on a matter which was never raised by
the parties to this appeal:
"We are of the opinion that the State by enacting comprehensive and complete laws pertaining to sexual offenses has pre-empted that field."
Such a holding is contrary to the previous decisions of this court. Thus in the case of Salt Lake City
v. Kusse, 97 U. 113, 93 P.2d 671, wherein the defendant was convicted of violating a city ordinance prohibiting the driving of an automobile while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor, the defendant contended that the state statute upon the same subject
had application throughout the state and the city ordinance was in conflict with the state statute since the
latter provided a more stringent penalty for a second
offense than did the city ordinance. The court in that
case held that the grant of general police power to
cities under then Section 15-8-84, Revised Statu,tes of
Utah, 1933, which is identical to present Section 108-84, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, cited in the court's
opinion and respondent's original briefs, authorized
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the city to pass an ordinance to prevent driving under
the influence of intoxicating liquors. The court then
held as follows respecting the right of the city to legislate in an area covered by state statute:
"Does Sec. 57-7-14, R.S.U. 1933, being of
state wide application and designed to prevent
driving anywhere in the state while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor, prevent the enactment of an ordinance preventing in the cities
the same thing?
"The solution of this question depends on the
following principles: An ordinance dealing with
the same subject as a statute is invalid only if
prohibited by the statute or inconsistent therewith. (Citing several cases) ." (Emphasis added) .
The court then concluded that in determing whether
an ordinance is in conflict with general laws, the test
is whether the ordinance permits or licenses that which
the statute forbids or prohibits and vice versa.
The J(usse case clearly establishes as the law of
this state that cities may legislate on the same subjects
as state statutes and are precluded from doing so only
if expressly prohibited by the statute or if the ordinance
is inconsistent with the general law. Furthermore the
Kusse case clearly establishes that the general grant
of police power to cities is sufficient to support an ordinance pertaining to drunk driving. Certainly the same
rule would be applicable to Salt Lake City's ordinance
prohibiting sexual intercourse for hire and related
offenses. If the public health, morals and welfare are
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,.,

properly invoked in drunk driving legislation, it would
appear inconceivable that this court should rule that
the offering to commit or committing an act of sexual
intercourse for hire and related offenses would not be
included in such power. It is this very question which
the majority of this court undertook to determine in
its opinion but summarily discarded with the all-inclusive holding that the state had pre-empted the field
of municipal regulation of sexual offenses. As authority
for its sweeping conclusion the court cites 37 Am. Jur.
p. 791. A close examination of that general text reveals
the conflict of authorities upon the express question
involved in this case. Thus it is said at pages 792-793
of 37 Am. Jur._, Municipal Corporations, § 166:
"There is quite a conflict of authority as to
the validity of municipal police ordinances enacted under a general welfare clause or other
general grant of power where the offense is also
covered by laws of the state. In many states it
is held that under a general delegation of power
a municipal corporation may regulate acts or
impose penalties for acts which by the statutes
of the state are regulated or declared to be
crimes. The reasons underlying this view are
that the exigencies of municipal life require
more rigid regulation than is required in rural
sections of the state. Clearly, many acts are far
more injurious, and the temptation to commit
them is much greater, in congested areas than
in the state at large, and when done they are
not only injurious to the public at large but
constitute added injury to the inhabrtants of
the local community. Therefore, the municipality
6

may exercise necessary implied authority in
police control in imposing penal regulations consistent with the Constitution and laws of a state,
even though the act has been made a penal offense by state statute."
And in 37 Am. Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 165,
p. 791, the law is stated as follows with respect to dif.
ference of penalties between city ordinances and general
state statutes on the same subject:
"A municipal ordinance is not in conflict with
a statute authorizing its adoption because of
a difference in penalties. Thus, further and additional penalties may be imposed by ordinance
than are imposed by statute, without creating
inconsistency, and, conversely, at least in some
instances lesser penalties may be imposed by the
ordinance for violation than by the statute without conflict."
See also Annotation, 138 A.L.R. 1208, 1214.
Clearly the State of Utah has aligned itself among
these jurisdictions which support the foregoing general
rules by its ruling in the K usse case. To hold otherwise
is a clear abdication by this court of adherence to the
rule of stare decisis.
The K usse case is not alone in holding as it does.
In American Fork; v. Charlier, 43 U. 231, 134 P. 739,
this court held as follows in the area of liquor regulation by cities:
"In view of the several provisions of the statutes we have quoted above, can any reasonable
7

doubt exist in the mind of any one that the Legislature intended to and did confer ample power
upon the municipalities of this state to pass
ordinances prohibiting and punishing the sale
or other disposition in any manner within the
corporate jurisdiction of intoxicating liquors,
and that this may be done although the statutes
of the state likewise prohibit and punish sales
and disposition? The overwhelming weight of
authority in this country is to the effect that,
where such power is conferred upon municipalities, they may prohibit and punish the same acts
that are prohibited and punished by the state
laws, and may impose the same penalties imposed by the state laws, if within the jurisdiction
of the municipal courts. 2 McQuillin, Mun.
Corps. §§ 877, 878; 28 Cyc. 696; Black on Int.
Liqs. § 225; 1 W. & T. Law of Int. Liqs. § 280;
See, also, Ex parte Simmons, 4 Okl. Cr. 662, 112
Pac. 951; same case on rehearing, 5 Okl. Cr.
399, 115 Pac. 380, where the authorities upon
the subject are reviewed in an exhaustive opinion. To the same effect is Oklahoma City v.
Spence (Okl. Cr.) 126 Pac. 701."
In a concurring opinion of Justice Straup is the
Charlier case it was also stated as follows at page 7 45
of 134 Pacific Reporter:
"The prohibition, regulation, or restriction of
the sale of intoxicating liquors relates peculiarly
to the police powers of the state. That the Legislature may confer police power upon municipalities over subjects within the provisions of
existing state laws is now pretty generally
recognized. This court is committed to that
doctrine. 'Vhere, as here, such power is con-
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ferred, the municipality may prohibit and punish
acts which are also prohibited and punished as
misdemeanors under a general statute of the
state, and each may provide a separate and different punishment. In such case the municipality
may prescribe and fix a fine and penalty for
the violation of its ordinance, the same as or
different from that prescribed and fixed by the
statute for the violation of a statute regarding
the same subject-matter, providing the fine or
penalty prescribed by the municipality is within the power conferred upon it to prescribe
and fix fines and penalties. Within that limitation the fine or penalty prescribed by a municipality for the violation of its ordinance may
be greater or less than that prescribed by the
statute for a violation of a statute regarding
the same subject-matter. Whether, therefore,
the penalty prescribed by the municipality is
authorized is not dependent upon the question
of whether the penalty so prescribed by it is
the same as that prescribed by the statute for
the violation of a statute regarding the same subject-matter, but whether it is within the power
conferred upon it to prescribe fines and fix penalties. So, whether the penalty prescribed by
the ordinance for bidding the sale of intoxicating
liquors is the same as or different from that prescribed by the statute also forbidding such sale
is not controlling. The pertinent question is, Is
the penalty fixed by the ordinance within the
power conferred upon the municipality by Section 260x87 heretofore referred to? I think it is.''
And in Salt Lake City v. Howe, 37 U. 170, 106 P. 705,
Ann. Cas. 1912 C, 189, this court held that "the Legislature could confer police powers upon the munici9

pality over subjects within the prov1Slons of existing
state laws, and authorize it, by ordinance, to prohibit
and punish acts which are also prohibited and punishable as misdemeanors under the general statutes of
the state.'' In that case the city's ordinance regulating
the inspection and sale of milk was upheld under the
city's general grant of police power under the predecessor to Section 10-8-84, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as well as its power to secure the general health of
the city and to prevent the introduction of contagious
diseases under the predecessor to present Section 108-61, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
See also Thorpe v. Bamberger R. Co., 107 U. 265,
153 P.2d 541, citing the Kusse case as the law of this
state pertaining to the test of conflict between city
ordinances and general laws, and City of Bellingham
v. Schampera, Wash. 1960, 356 P.2d 292, a recent case
which cites extensively from the Kusse decision.
There has been no express rejection of the above
authorities by this court. If the holding in the [( usse
case is to be overruled it should be done expressly and
the court should set forth its reasons for so doing. To
overrule the long established law of this jurisdiction
by the magic wave of the "pre-emption" wand neither
serves the ends of orderly justice nor the preservation
of respect for this court's deliberations. If the foregoing cases are correct, then the court's decision in
this case is dead wrong. If the foregoing cases are now
to be replaced by the judicial exercise of appellate
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judges who perceive their function to m1mm1ze local
police power by the process of judicial legislation, then
those responsible for such changes in the law should
have the courage to point out wherein their predecessors
have erred. If this criticism of the majority opinion
seems unduly harsh, it is submitted that the undersigned are exercising that privilege which then Chief
Justice Henriod reserved to the citizens of this state
in his concurring opinion in State v. Louden, 15 U.2d
64, 387 P.2d 240, wherein he stated as follows with
respect to his own criticism of the United States Supreme Court in a matter not entirely unlike that in
this case:
"In the nature of things I accept the decisions
of the Supreme Court, but reserve the right,
until bondage pre-empts it, to criticize them. I
reserve to the citizens of my state the same privilege with respect to my opinions."
It is submitted that Section 76-53-10, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, has not pre-empted the city from
enacting the ordinance in question in this case merely
because it covers a wide range of acts pertaining to
the soliciting or securing patronage for prostitution
as well as the procuring of females for the purpose
of prostitution. In this connection it should also be
pointed out that the legislature in adopting said section,
did not contemplate the same definition for prostitution that the majority opinion has adopted, i.e., indiscriminate sexual intercourse with men. Thus it is
provided therein that "any person who procures a
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female person for the purpose of prostitution for a
niale person'' is guilty of a felony. Certainly such a
provision could not be construed to require proof of
indiscriminate sexual intercourse with men when it
specifically relates to an act of procurement for a male
person. A male person is most definitely singular and
incapable of being construed in the plural sense. The
same reasoning is applicable to another portion of
said statute which makes it an offense for any person
"who by any means sends, directs, takes or conveys
any female person to any room or other place for the
purpose of prostitution with or for another male
person." It would appear quite beyond dispute that the
city ordinances in question in this case prohibit the
same conduct contemplated by the above portions of
Section 76-53-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and, in
view of the foregoing authorities, should be sustained
as valid by this court.

POINT II
TI-IE STATUTES OF THE STATE OF
lJTAlI DO NOT MAKE PROSTITUTION OR
THE COM1\1ISSION OF AN ACT OF SEXUAL
INTERCOURSE FOR HIRE A STATE OFFENSE.
In the majority op1mon it is stated by Justice
Tuckett that the decision will not hamper law enforcement in dealing with vice inasmuch as police officers
have the duty of enforcing state law as well as muni·
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cipal ordinances. Inherent in such a statement is th<;
clear implication that the present state laws cover the
acts proscribed by the city ordinance which the court
has stricken down under the pre-emption theory. Although the court's ruling only applies to subsections
7 and 8 of the city's "sexual intercourse for hire" ordinance, relating to the directing of any person to any
place for such purpose of aiding and abetting such
a person, the court's majority opinion goes much further by its accepted definition of "prostitution" which
will require the city to adopt an unenforceable ordinance on prostitution by reason of the impossible
evidentiary burden that such an ordinance entails. The
effect of this court's decision upon the remainder of
the city ordinance relating to the offense of committing
or offering to commit an act of sexual intercourse for
hire is graphically illustrated by the recent extraordinary writs issued by the Third Judicial District Court
against the prosecution of such cases in the city courts.
The concept of prostitution, houses of prostitution
and pandering which was common in the early part of
this century when most of our state laws pertaining
thereto were adopted is far from adequate or realistic
in dealing with the modern "call girl" operation under
a referral system which dispenses sex for sale through
extremely sophisticated and seemingly socially acceptable channels. The expensive hotels, apartments and
motels have replaced the bawdy houses, houses of assignation and houses of prostitution of yesteryear which
were commonly known and designated as such in re-
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stricted areas often protected by public officials. The
telephone has replaced the pimp and procurer to a large
extent and the ingenius methods of referral of customers
to avoid detection by law enforcement agencies has
replaced the open solicitation from doorways and windows.
It is clear beyond any dispute that the act of
prostitution itself and the communicable diseases which
it necessarily generates have always been viewed by
the legislature as matters of local concern requiring
regulation by municipalities. That this is so is manifestly evident by the complete lack of any statewide statute
prohibiting prostitution as such or sexual intercourse
for hire. The state statutes cited by the majority opinion
deal with pandering, procuring for prostitution, profiting from the earnings of prostitutes, etc., but none of
such statutes makes it an offense to be a prostitute or
perform an act of prostitution. The only statute approaching such a prohibition is Section 76-61-1 (10),
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides that
" ( e) very common prostitute, and every woman who
from the doorways on the streets or any other place
solicits men for immoral purposes" is a vagrant and
punishable by imprisonment. The hazards and pitfalls
of that statute are many. At what point does a prostitute become a com1non prostitute, and what constitutes
"immoral purposes" constitutionally enforceable under
the latter part of the definition? See State v. Musser,
118 U. 537, 223 P.2d 193.
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The state statutes are silent upon an act or acts
of sexual intercourse for hire. There is no state statute
under which such an act can be prosecuted.
It follows from the foregoing that the self-serving
statement of the majority opinion that its holding will
not hamper law enforcement in dealing with vice is
clearly misleading and calculated to allay the fears of
public officials and the public at large that the decision
erodes the power of municipalities to effectively control
prostitution. It certainly does not take any great power
of discernment to recognize that prosecutions for prostitution under the requirements laid down by this court
will fall drastically and perhaps entirely by reason of
this decision. That the legislature may correct such an
obvious unintended judicial result will be of little
comfort to the law abiding citizens and families of this
state who must accept "sex for hire" as a lawful pursuit
on a statewide basis until that time arrives.

POINT III
SALT LAKE CITY DOES HAVE AUTHORITY TO EN ACT THE ORDINANCE IN QUESTION.
The respondent incorporates herein the argument
set forth under Point I with respect to the power of
the city under Section 10-8-84, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, to enact the ordinance in question. This general
grant of police power to cities authorizes them to "zxiss
all ordinances arul rules, and make all regulations, not
15

repugnant to law, * * * cu are necessary and proper
to provide for the safety and preserve the health, and
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and
good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the
inhabitants thereof * * *."
In addition to the many Utah cases cited in the
respondent's supplemental brief in which the above
statute has been held to authorize ordinances relating
to the preservation of health and protection of public
morals, the court is asked to consider the following
from 42 Am. Jur., Prostitutes, § 2:
"The management of those vocations which
minister to and feed upon human weaknesses,
appetites and passions comes directly within the
scope of what is known as the police power."
As authority for the above, the text cites the case of
L'Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587, 20 S. Ct. 788,
44 L.Ed. 899, in which the Supreme Court of the United
States upheld the power of the city to establish districts
within which prostitutes could live as against the claim
of constitutional deprivation of property by affected
landowners. In so holding the United States Supreme
Court declared:
"In this respect we premise by saying that
one of the difficult social problems of the day is
what shall be done in respect to those vocations
which minister to and feed upon human weaknesses. appetites and passions. The management
of these 1•ocations comes directly within the scope
of what is known as the police power. They
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affect directly the public health and morals.
'.l'hei.r management be~omes a matter of growmg importance, especially in our larger cities,
where from the very density of population the
things which minister to vice tend to increase
and multiply. It has been often said that the
police power was not by the Federal Constitution transferred to the nation, but was reserved
to the states, and that upon them rests the duty
of so exercising it as to protect the public health
and morals. While, of course, that power cannot
be exercised by the states in any way to infringe
upon the powers expressly granted to Congress,
yet until there is some invasion of congressional
power or of private rights secured by the Constitution of the United States, the action of the
states in this respect is beyond question in the
courts of the nation." (Emphasis added).
Can there be any question that those who engage
in sexual intercourse for hire are not involved in a vocation which directly affects the public health and morals?
It would appear too clear for argument that the spread
of loathsome venereal diseases can in large measure "be
attributed to prostitution and sex acts for hire. The
prohibition against the commission of an act. of sexual
intercourse for hire has the beneficial double effect of
preventing both prostitution as this court has defined
it and the spread of communicable disease. With respect
to the latter, Section 10-8-61, Utah Code A.nnotated,
1953, also expressly authorizes cities to secure the general health of the city and prevent the introduction of
contagious diseases into the city.
In the addition to the foregoing, Section 10-8-41,
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Utah Code Annotated, 1953, authorizes cities to sup-

press or prohibit the keeping of disorderly houses among
other things, and Section 10-8-47, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides that cities "may prevent * * * all
disorderly conduct * * *." Justice Ellett in his dissenting opinion has indicated that there is no better way
to prohibit the keeping of disorderly houses than by
drying up the source of revenue upon which they feed.
At common law a "disorderly house" is one in which
people resort to the disturbance of the neighborhood
or for purposes which are injurious to the public morals,
health, convenience or safety. See Martin v. State,
62 Ga. App. 902, 10 S.E.2d 254, 255; City of Ottumwa
v. Stickel, 195 Iowa 988, 191 N.W. 797. And in City
nf St. Paul v. Morris, 258 Minn. 467, 104 N.W.2d
902, certiorari denied 365 U.S. 815, 5 L.Ed.2d 693,
it was held that "disorderly conduct" embraces acts
which corrupt the public morals or outrage the sense
of public decency. Does not the sale of sexual acts
come within the above definitions? In addition to the
authorities that we have heretofore cited with respect
to the city's powers to preserve the public health and
morals, it is submitted that the grant of power contained
in said Sections 10-8-41 and 10-8-47 authorizes the ordinance here in question. It is further submitted that
the majority opinion was in error in stating that said
Section 10-8-41 dealt only with prostitution thus supporting its conclusion that the ordinance in question
went beyond the power of cities to suppress prostitution.
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CONCLUSION
The majority opinion in this case is diametrically
opposed to the previous decisions of this court and the
Supreme Court of the United States. The pre-emption
theory of the court was never advanced by the parties
to this litigation and is clearly contrary to the established law of this state. The court should carefully
review this aspect of the case and, hopefully, discard
it in order that a proper decision can be rendered by
the court upon the question of the respondent's statutory power to enact the ordinance in question.
Respectfully submitted,
HOMER HOLMGREN
Salt Lake City Attorney
JACK L. CRELLIN
Assistant Salt Lake City Attorney
DON L. BYBEE
Assistant Salt Lake City Prosecutor
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
Salt Lake City Corporation
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